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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is generally defined as a process in which parties
voluntarily agree to submit a dispute to an impartial third person
called an arbitrator,' who is often selected by the parties2 and is em-
powered to make a decision based on the evidence and the parties'
arguments.3 Because of its contractual nature, arbitration claims a
central role in settling today's commercial disputes.4 By structuring
the agreement to fit their needs, parties can tailor the arbitration
agreement to provide significant advantages over other forms of dis-
pute resolution. 5  For example, arbitration is generally faster,
1. See GABRIEL M. WILNER, 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:01, at 1 (rev ed.
1995) (hereinafter DOMKE). To be voluntary, the parties must specifically and expressly agree
to arbitrate their disputes. Such agreements can be accomplished in one of two ways. First, the
parties may include an arbitration clause in an initial contract, identifying the types of future
disputes that will be arbitrated. Second, the parties may agree to arbitrate as a reactionary
measure, when a dispute has arisen and either the parties did not originally agree to arbitrate
or their agreement did not cover the type of dispute at issue. See id.
2. The parties may select the arbitrators themselves or provide a method for their
selection. If this process fails, most courts are directed by statute to provide an arbitrator. See
The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) [hereinafter FAA].
3. See DOMEE, supra note 1, § 1:01, at 1.
4. See Stephen J. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.BJA. J. 78, 79 (1985).
According to then American Arbitration Association President Robert Coulson, "more commer-
cial claims are arbitrated than tried before a jury." Id. The arbitration boom has shown no sign
of remission, as the volume and dollar amount of arbitration filings has continued to expand
considerably in recent years. See Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peebles, Commercial Arbitration in
Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 348 & n.9,
355 & n.40 (1995). The unprecedented number of recent Supreme Court opinions concerning
arbitration also indicate the vitality and continuing evolution of arbitration. See, e.g., Doctors
Assocs., Inc. v. Paul Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656, (1996) (finding that the FAA preempted a
Montana law aimed specifically at arbitration agreements); Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, SAL
v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995) (finding that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act does
not nullify foreign arbitration clauses contained in maritime bills of lading); First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (determining when circumstances require the
court or the arbitrator to decide whether the parties intended to arbitrate); Mastruobono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58-64 (1995) (finding that an arbitrator was within
his power to award punitive damages when state law was to the contrary); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-82 (1995) (determining the breadth of the FAA
under Congress's Commerce Clause powers).
The scope of arbitration is quite broad. It is used in a variety of contexts ranging from
"traditional commercial transactions such as the sale and purchase of commodities and manu-
factured goods" to controversies arising from inter-insurance company subrogation claims.
DOMEE, supra note 1, § 1:01, at 3. Arbitration is also found in relatively new areas of law, such
as uninsured motorist accident claims and medical malpractice. See id.
5. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.BA J. 274, 276-77 (1982); see
also Meyerowitz, supra note 4, at 78-79. Congress also recognized some of these advantages in a
report from a committee of the House of Representatives when it passed legislation on voluntary
patent arbitration found in 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1994). See Patent and Trademark
Office-Authorizations, Amendments, Schedule of Fees, H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 13 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 777.
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cheaper, and more private than litigation.6 The parties can also cre-
ate their own discovery process and procedural devices.7 In addition,
the arbitrator, who is usually better informed than judges or juries
about trade customs and technologies, can conduct the proceedings in
an informal setting at a non-stressful pace.s Moreover, arbitration
reduces hostility and is, therefore, less disruptive of current and fu-
ture dealings between the parties.9 Perhaps most importantly,
though, arbitration is fully capable of dealing with today's complex
business situations' o and can provide a wide range of relief."
To retain these advantages, and thus provide incentives for its
use, arbitration must render a final and binding determination.12
While this requirement does not absolutely foreclose the availability
of judicial review, it does require extremely circumscribed limits on its
use."s Such a narrow level of review is crucial for two reasons. First,
if arbitration awards were subject to greater judicial review, arbitra-
tion would become a mere stepping-stone to litigation. Losers un-
happy with the determination and victors believing they were under-
compensated would not hesitate to challenge in court what they per-
ceived as inappropriate awards.14 Supplementing the arbitration
process with non-deferential judicial review would eliminate many of
the advantages originally gained using arbitration.5 Second, a
6. See Meyerowitz, supra note 4, at 79-80.
7. See id. at 80.
8. See Burger, supra note 5, at 277.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 13.
10. See Burger, supra note 5, at 277.
11. Arbitrators often have more remedies available for their use than do courts. See
generally Michael F. Hoellering, Remedies in Arbitration, 20 FORuM 516 (1985) (analyzing
various forms of remedies available in nonlabor arbitration).
12. See Burger, supra note 5, at 277. The subject matter of this Note deals with voluntary
commercial, binding arbitration. Other forms of dispute resolution are often referred to as
arbitration, even though they are compulsory or nonbinding. See, e.g., RICHARD J. MEDALIE,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990S 18 (1991) (discussing compulsory, nonbinding judicial
arbitration). Arbitration should also not be confused with mediation or conciliation, which are
often referred to as nonbinding arbitration. See Lawless v. Cedar Vale Reg. Hosp., 850 P.2d
795, 800 (Kan. 1993); DOMKE, supra note 1, § 1:02, at 4-5.
13. See National Wrecking Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 731, 990 F.2d
957, 960 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow because arbitration is
intended to be the final resolution of disputes.").
14. Of course, such a result only occurs if the dissatified party expects the benefits of such
action to outweigh its costs.
15. See Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting
that limited judicial review avoids undermining arbitration's twin goals of efficient dispute
resolution and avoidance of costly litigation); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 682 (11th Cir. 1992)
(observing that arbitration eases court congestion and provides an efficient alternative to
litigation); E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 614 (7th
Cir. 1986) (stating that "an extremely low standard of review is necessary to prevent arbitration
from becoming merely an added preliminary step to judicial resolution"). As one court stated:
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system that constantly provided for a "second bite at the apple" would
do little to establish the faith and confidence that any system of dis-
pute resolution requires. 16 Parties must believe that the award will
be final, or arbitration loses its appeal as a true alternative to litiga-
tion. The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") satisfies this requirement
by narrowly circumscribing judicial review of arbitration awards. 17
Specifically, the FAA commands the courts to confirm all arbitration
awards,, unless certain limited grounds for vacatur, modification, or
correction are found to exist. 9
Some parties have attempted to expand contractually upon the
limited judicial review available for an arbitrator's decision,20 how-
ever, by agreeing before arbitration that the award can be reviewed
Where parties have selected arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, they
presumably have done so in recognition of the speed and inexperiences of the arbitral
process; federal courts ill serve these aims and that of the facilitation of commercial
intercourse by engaging in any more rigorous review than is necessary to ensure
compliance with statutory standards.
Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
16. See Remmey v. Painewebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that
parties would cease to use arbitration if courts did not resist the temptation to redecide arbitral
decisions); Richmond Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Transportation Communications
Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 282-83 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Nothing would be more destructive to
arbitration than the perception that its finality depended upon the particular perspectives of the
judges who review the award."). This premise is based on the same policy considerations that
support res judicata. That doctrine has been found to rest on "reason, justice, fairness,
expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity. Public policy, judicial orderliness,
economy of judicial time, and the interest of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society,
all require that stability should be accorded judgments .... " 46 AM. JUR. Judgments § 515, at
776-77 (1994) (citations omitted); see also G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 664 (1988) (finding res judicata to be
"an essential doctrine if any agreement to be bound by the arbitrator's award is to have
meaning").
17. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). For a more comprehensive description of the FAA and its
interpretations, see infra Part III.
18. See 9 U.S.C. § 9.
19. The FAA allows for vacatur:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Id. § 10. The grounds for modification or correction are also extremely limited and will be
discussed along with the importance of the FAA in Part III.
20. See Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995);
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 702 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Fils Et Cables
d'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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on grounds beyond those provided by the FAA.21 Contractually in-
creasing the scope of available judicial review creates a tension in the
law. On the one hand, arbitration is a creature of contract, and the
parties should be allowed to bargain for whatever they want. This
characteristic is the driving force behind arbitration and provides the
incentive for parties to arbitrate. The contractual adaptability of
arbitration, which allows it to meet the parties' needs in an efficient
manner, is the bedrock upon which all of the above-mentioned advan-
tages are based. On the other hand, allowing parties to use this con-
tractual power to increase the available level of review potentially
undermines efficiency and confidence in the system. Allowing parties
to increase the scope of review may lead to increased costs, a longer
dispute resolution process, and additional reductions in other advan-
tages originally gained by avoiding litigation. Increasing the judicial
role may also diminish the parties' confidence in the ability of arbitra-
tion to produce final and binding awards. Moreover, whether parties
have the power to change the limited role the FAA confers upon the
courts is unclear.
21. The judicial review clause for which the parties contracted in LaPine provides a clear
example of a contractual expansion upon the proscribed level of review in the FAA
The arbitrators shall issue a written award which shall state the bases of the award and
include detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of California may enter judgment upon any award,
either by confirming the award or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The
Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) based upon any of the grounds
referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitrator's findings of fact are
not supported by substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of law
are erroneous.
LaPine Tech. Corp., 909 F. Supp. at 702.
These clauses are most likely a fearful reaction to a perceived unpredictability in arbitra-
tion, which results from the arbitrator's enormous power. For instance, an arbitrator can
fashion almost any relief, including specific performance. Unless contracted for, the arbitrator's
award need not even be accompanied by a written opinion explaining her reasoning. See
Meyerowitz, supra note 4, at 80. That reasoning may not be what the parties had in mind, since
an arbitrator "may fashion law to fit the facts of a particular case... may intentionally disre-
gard traditional rules of law; or reach a decision contrary to law." Paul D. Pearlstein, The Tao
of Arbitration, 6 CoM. L. BULL. 22,23 (1991) (citations omitted).
Of course, placing limits upon the arbitrator may result in increased predictability. This
approach may not always provide the answer, however. The parties may believe that expanded
judicial review is the only acceptable safety net to make arbitration feasible. For example, in
securities or franchise agreements, customers or franchisees may question the impartiality of
industry arbitrators. See Hugh R. Combs & Jeffrey W. Sarles, Courts Examine Whether
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Can Be Expanded by Contract, NAVL L.J., Aug. 19, 1996,
at B5. Placing an award limitation upon a biased arbitrator will not change the outcome, as the
limitation only dictates that the amount or type of award be within a specified range.
Arbitration remains a viable, if somewhat less efficient, alternative, however, if bias-fearing
parties are allowed to contract for expanded judicial review.
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The resolution of this issue is critical to the evolution of arbi-
tration.22 As arbitration continues to move to the forefront of dispute
resolution,3 the creation of a standardized framework becomes essen-
tial.24 The increasing complexity and volume of arbitration cases have
forced many parties to consider adopting additional procedural safe-
guards to protect against unpredictable results.m Parties must know
if they can rely on the courts to give effect to these procedural safe-
guards. If courts begin to limit the contractual adaptability of arbi-
tration to changing circumstances, party confidence in the arbitration
process may suffer. This Note focuses on only one procedural
safeguard, the propriety of contracting for an expanded level of
judicial review in arbitration agreements. The resulting analysis,
however, may be applicable to other questions concerning the extent
to which parties may alter the typical arbitration procedure.26
Part II develops the issue by discussing cases that have ad-
dressed the question, but arrived at conflicting answers. Part III
provides additional background with an historical inquiry into the
purposes behind the FAA and a look at how the act is interpreted
today. An analysis of two Supreme Court decisions in which the con-
tractual nature of arbitration was found to outweigh other considera-
tions follows in Part IV. Part V concludes that the contractual nature
of arbitration, coupled with policy considerations, dictates that parties
be allowed to expand the available scope of judicial review.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: CONTRADICTORY RULINGS
The propriety of parties' contractually increasing the court's
role in the arbitration process is not clear. Strong arguments exist
22. See Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983.1995. A
Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 37-38 (1996) (finding that the one significant arbitra-
tion issue open for the Supreme Court concerns the nature and scope of judicial review of the
merits of commercial arbitration awards).
23. See supra note 4.
24. See Hayford & Peebles, supra note 4, at 346-50.
25. See John F.X Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, Appellate Review of Arbitration Decisions,
213 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1995) (discussing arbitration arising out of securities agreements); supra note
21.
26. The broader question concerns the limits on what parties can contract for in
arbitration agreements while still expecting judicial enforcement. Clearly some limit must
exist. For example, if parties were to enter into an agreement, which contained an arbitration
clause, to commit a crime, and upon a dispute an arbitrator ordered one party to commit the
crime, it is inconceivable that the judiciary would enforce the award, regardless of the FAA's
direction. While this Note is not intended to explore such limitations, it may provide a
framework to help answer questions concerning the extent to which parties may alter the
arbitration process itself.
400 [Vol. 50:395
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both for and against allowing such alterations. These arguments are
highlighted in the following federal cases, 27 which have arrived at
conflicting resolutions.
A. Let the Parties Contract for Whatever They Want
1. In re Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp.
In re Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens (FICAL) v. Midland Metals
Corp. was the first federal case to address whether parties to an
arbitration agreement could contractually increase the scope of judi-
cial review provided by the FAA.28 In FICAL, Midland Metals
27. The focus of this Note is on the FAA, since it governs most arbitration agreements.
See infra Part III.B. The decision to focus on federal cases was based on the assumption that
federal courts are'better equipped than their state counterparts to interpret a federal statute.
See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (comparing the
abilities of federal and state courts in adjudicating constitutional claims). This decision is not
meant to imply that a look into state court decisions would be fruitless. Most arbitration claims
brought in a state court will also be governed by the FAA. See infra Part Ill.B. Even when the
claim is one of the few that is not governed by the FAA or when a state court erroneously
applies state law, the analysis will most likely be the same, since most state statutes are largely
similar to the FAA, and many provide virtually identical grounds for judicial review. See, for
example, the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) which provides for vacatur when:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in
any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown therefor
or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the
hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights
of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in
proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing
without raising an objection....
UNIFORM ARBrIRATION AcT § 12, 7 U.LA. 140 (1985 & Supp. 1995). Thirty-five states have
adopted the UAA. See id. at 1. Only the fifth ground presents any substantive departure from
the FAA, and it is merely a codification of standard judicial procedure. See also GEORGE
GOLDBERG, A LAWYERS GumE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 62 (1983) ("The grounds for judicial
vacatur of an arbitration award are surprisingly uniform throughout the United States-more
uniform, in fact, than any other aspect of arbitration law."). Thus, when a state court is con-
fronted with the parties' contractual attempt to alter its role in the arbitration process, it will
often face the same difficulties. Should the court honor the contractual nature of arbitration by
undermining its inherent advantages? In finding an answer, state courts, which have fared no
better than the federal courts examined in this Part, are split. Compare, e.g., Dick v. Dick, 534
N.W.2d 185, 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (finding no authority in the state statute that would
permit the parties to appeal substantive matters after completing arbitration) with NAB Constr.
Corp. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 579 N.Y.S.2d 375, 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (allowing the
parties to alter judicial review of arbitration awards to determine if an award was arbitrary,
capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to evidence bad faith).
28. 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Corporation entered into two contracts for the purchase of galvanized
wire from FICAL.29 Both contracts contained arbitration clauses that
provided for an expanded level of judicial review should either party
seek confirmation of an arbitration award.30 A dispute arose over the
wire's specifications, and the parties entered into arbitration.3' An
arbitration panel entered an award, which Midland Metals
challenged.3 2
Faced with the issue that is the subject of this Note, the court
recognized that review of arbitration awards is normally quite lim-
ited, encompassing only a search for a violation of one of the grounds
enumerated in sections 10 or 11 of the FAA33 Although the court
noted its obligation to confirm the award pursuant to section 9 absent
the existence of one of the enumerated grounds,3 it recognized that
arbitration is a "creature of contract" entirely dependent upon agree-
ment.35 Expounding upon this contractual nature, the court noted
that it could not consider any issue that the parties had agreed to
arbitrate and that a party who had not agreed to arbitrate could not
be compelled to do so.36 The court then concluded that a party could
not be forced to arbitrate under a set of rules for which it had not
contracted.3 7
Applying this logic, the court found that not only had the par-
ties agreed to modify the standard role of the court and the arbitrator
in the arbitration process, but that they were wholly within their
contractual rights to do so.18 The court argued that only a jurisdic-
29. See id. at 242.
30. See id. The portion of the agreements pertaining to the level ofjudicial review read as
follows:
The arbitrator shall make findings of fact and shall render an award based thereon and
a transcript of the evidence adduced thereat shall, upon request, be made available to
either party. Upon an application to the court for an order confirming said award, the
court shall have the power to review (1) whether the findings of fact rendered by the
arbitrator are, on the entire record of said arbitration proceedings, supported by
substantial evidence, and (2) whether as a matter of law based on said findings of fact
the award should be affirmed, modified, or vacated. Upon such determination, judgment
shall be entered in favor of either party consistent therewith.
Id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 242-43.
33. See id. at 243. See supra note 19 and infra note 103 and accompanying text for a de-
scription of the contents of sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.
34. See FICAL, 584 F. Supp. at 243. See note 100 and accompanying text for a description
of the contents of section 9.
35. See FICAL, 584 F. Supp. at 243-44.
36. See id. at 244.
37. See id.
38. See id.
402 [Vol. 50:395
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tional or public policy barrier should serve to prevent the parties from
contracting in such a fashion to alter the standard roles3 9
Focusing first on the jurisdictional question, the court found
that since the FAA does not in itself supply jurisdiction, it does not
preclude parties from increasing the role of the courts.40 Before a
party can seek to confirm an arbitration award in federal court, the
court must have subject matter jurisdiction arising from the claim
itself.41 Because the diversity of the parties supplied jurisdiction in
this case, jurisdiction was not an impediment to the parties' agree-
ment.42
According to the court, public policy also did not preclude the
parties from increasing the level of review.43 Noting that the parties'
agreement removed much of the incentive to resort to arbitration
because of a reduction in efficiency, the court still found such an
agreement to be beneficial because of the resulting reduction in the
court's burden.4 Even with an increased level of review, the court
was only asked to "review the arbitrator's findings for substantial
evidence and legal validity," which was "clearly a far less searching
and time-consuming inquiry than a full trial."45
2. Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.
An arbitration agreement in which the parties had contractu-
ally agreed to expand the standard level of judicial review was also
the subject of controversy in Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp.46 MCI and Gateway had entered into a
contract that included a binding arbitration clause that expanded the
typical grounds for judicial review, allowing appeal for errors of law 7
A dispute arose and the parties entered into arbitration.48 The
arbitrator found in favor of Gateway and ordered an award of punitive
39. See id.
40. See id.; infra note 130 and accompanying text.
41. See FICAL, 584 F. Supp. at 244.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995). Gateway would serve as MCrs subcontractor on a job that
MCI had obtained from the Virginia Department of Corrections. Under the contract, Gateway
was to install and maintain a prison telephone system over lines secured by MCI. See id. at
995.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 995-96.
1998] 403
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damages and attorney's fees.49 Gateway then asked the District Court
for the Northern District of Texas to confirm the award, while MCI
simultaneously filed a motion to have it vacated50 The district court
interpreted the "errors of law" language included in the parties' arbi-
tration agreement as requiring it to apply a "harmless error standard,
with due regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration."51 The
district court's refusal to review errors of law de novo was apparently
based on its concern that such an increased level of review would
sacrifice the "simplicity, informality and expedition" of arbitration.52
Under the harmless error standard, the court confirmed the award.53
Finding the harmless error standard applied by the district
court to be an insufficient level of scrutiny under the arbitration
agreement, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the award de novo. 54 The ap-
pellate court recognized that judicial review of arbitration awards is
normally quite narrow since it is circumscribed by the grounds listed
in the FAA.5 The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the contractual
nature of arbitration takes precedent over that limitation and that the
parties' contractual modification of the level of review was accept-
able.56 Finding that the FAA's purpose is to enforce contractual
agreements, the Fifth Circuit noted that failure to uphold the parties'
contractual arrangement would be inimical to that purpose.57 Thus,
because arbitration is a creature of contract, the court argued that
parties can contract for the rules governing it, just as they can
contract for what disputes they wish to have arbitrated.5
Unfortunately, the opinion did not address the district court's
assertion that this type of agreement would undermine the inherent
benefits of arbitration. Instead, the Fifth Circuit found only that the
49. See id. at 997-98.
50. See id. at 996.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 997.
53. See id. at 995.
54. See id. at 997.
55. See id. at 996.
56. See id.
57. See id. The court referenced Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S.
52, 57 (1995), for much of its discussion on the contractual nature of arbitration, and then cited
other Supreme Court cases in which the Court noted its reliance on the contractual nature of
arbitration in making decisions. See Gateway Tech., Inc., 64 F.3d at 996-99. Supreme Court
interpretations of the FAA are examined in Parts III.B and IV.
58. See Gateway Tech., Inc., 64 F.3d at 996. The court vacated the punitive damages
portion of the award, finding it to be inconsistent with Virginia law, thus making this decision
outcome determinative. See id. at 998-1001. Presumably, if the parties had not agreed to the
increased level of review, the Fifth Circuit would have been powerless to vacate the award
under the narrow standards supplied by the FAA-
404 [Vol. 50:395
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contractual nature of arbitration allowed the parties to alter the judi-
cial review rules of the FAA. It did not address any public policy
concerns.
B. What Happened to All Those Benefits?
In LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., the District
Court for the Northern District of California declined to follow FICAL
and Gateway,59 and refused to apply the expanded scope of review for
which the parties contracted.6° According to the court, the parties did
not have the right to alter the role of the court as provided by statute,
and such an agreement violated public policy. 61
LaPine and Kyocera had entered into a series of contracts in
which LaPine was to provide the technology that Kyocera required to
manufacture certain computer parts. 62 Kyocera was then supposed to
sell the completed parts to LaPine according to a production sched-
ule.63 Subsequent financial difficulties forced Lapine into a restruc-
turing, and Kyocera took part ownership s4 As part of the restructur-
ing, the parties signed an agreement containing an arbitration
clause.6 5 The arbitration agreement allowed for judicial review of
awards for substance and errors of law in addition to the FAA's stan-
dards.66
59. 909 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1995). As of the writing of this Note, the LaPine decision
was before the Ninth Circuit on appeal.
60. See id. at 701-06. The LaPine court is not the first district court to refuse to expand
its role in the arbitration process at the parties' request. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Gateway
was a reversal of such a refusal by the District Court for the Northern District of Texas. See
infra Part II.A.2.
61. See LaPine Tech. Corp., 909 F. Supp. at 701-06.
62. See id. at 699. Note that this summary is a simplified version of the agreements.
Only the background necessary to supply the context for the arbitration agreement has been
provided.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 700.
65. See id.
66. The relevant portions of the agreement read as follows:
The arbitrators shall issue a written award which shall state the bases of the award and
include detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of California may enter judgment upon any award,
either by confirming the award or by vacating, modifying or correcting any award. The
Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) based upon any of the grounds
referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitrators' findings of fact are
not supported by substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrators' conclusions of law
are erroneous.
Id. at 702.
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A dispute arose over Kyocera's compliance with the production
schedule.67 The parties entered into arbitration conducted before a
panel of the International Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce. 68 The arbitrators issued a final award in fa-
vor of LaPine, who then filed a motion with the district court asking
for confirmation.69 Kyocera opposed the confirmation and asked the
court to review the award under the agreement's expanded judicial
review clause and for vacatur or modification.70
Kyocera urged the court to accept the reasoning of Gateway
and FICAL, which had found that parties may contractually alter the
court's role in the arbitration process.71 Addressing the FICAL deci-
sion first, the district court noted that while the FICAL court had
enforced such an agreement, the court had also acknowledged that
jurisdictional or public policy considerations might dictate a different
outcome.72 Using this language, the district court then disagreed with
FICAL's conclusions on the effects of those considerations. 73
Relying on language in Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v.
Chicago Sun-Times,74 the LaPine court strongly asserted that parties
67. See id. at 701.
68. See id. at 698-99.
69. See id. at 699.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 701-02. See supra Part II.A.
72. LaPine, 909 F. Supp. at 702 (quoting Fils Et Cables d'Acier DeLens v. Midland Metals
Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("IThere appears to be no reason, absent a
jurisdictional or public policy barrier, why the parties cannot agree to alter the standard roles.")
(emphasis added by the LaPine court); supra Part II l.
73. See LaPine, 909 F. Supp. at 702.
74. 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991). The text on which the LaPine court relied is as follows:
"If the parties want, they can contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitra-
toer's award. But they cannot contract for judicial review of that award; federal jurisdiction
cannot be created by contract." Id. at 1505.
Kyocera claimed that Judge Posner, the author of the Chicago Typographical opinion, had
changed his stance in two later opinions, DDI Seamless Cylinder Int'l, Inc. v. General Fire
Extinguisher Corp., 14 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir. 1994), and Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc.,
28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994). The LaPine court disagreed. See LaPine Tech. Corp., 909 F.Supp.
at 703. A careful reading of those cases shows that the LaPine court was correct. Nothing in
either case indicates any change in Judge Posner's position.
Moreover, Judge Posner's statements in Chicago Typographical were probably not what
might be termed a "slip of the pen," since it was not the first case in which he expressed such
sentiments. See Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir. 1985).
Judge Posners statements were nothing more than dicta, however.
Chicago Typographical concerned a union's appeal from an arbitration award arising out of
a collective bargaining agreement. See Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 935 F.2d at 1503-
11. Because of a prior contractual agreement between the parties, neither party asked the court
to consider expanding its involvement. Thus, the issues in Chicago Typographical were not
legally or factually similar to the subject matter of this Note. Furthermore, federal jurisdiction
in Chicago Typographical was based on section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1994), which gives the courts jurisdiction to hear labor disputes. The FAA probably does not
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to an arbitration agreement could not alter the role of the court as
provided by statute. 5 The court argued that while a court may have
subject matter jurisdiction over the cause subject to arbitration, its
power to exercise that jurisdiction, particularly when conferred by
statute as here, cannot be altered by the parties' agreement. 6 Thus,
"the role of the federal courts cannot be subverted to serve private
interests at the whim of contracting parties."77 While noting that the
dispute resolution function of arbitration is nonjudicial by nature, the
court stated that the confirmation or vacation of such awards requires
a judicial act permitted by statute. 8 The court asserted that allowing
the parties to alter the court's role would usurp Congress's right to
determine the level of judicial review.7 9
The district court also departed from the reasoning of FICAL
by finding the agreement offensive to public policy.80 Noting that the
arbitration process in the case before it took four years and "produced
a record of substantial magnitude, including hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of exhibits," the court found that an increased level of review
would undermine the benefits contemplated by parties who see
"arbitration as an effective form of alternative dispute resolution."81
Thus, the court found that the attempted alteration of the court's role
apply to labor disputes. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 ("[Nlothing [in the FAA] shall apply to contracts of
employment...."); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36-43 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that federal courts
have relied on the FAA for guidance in hearing labor disputes, it has never indicated whether
this practice is correct. See United Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987). Why
the LaPine court would place so much reliance on dicta is curious, considering it did not find the
Supreme Coures opinions on the ability of parties to specify arbitration rules contractually
helpful for that very reason. See infra text accompanying note 85.
75. See LaPine Tech. Corp., 909 F. Supp at 703. Whether parties to an arbitration
agreement have the power to alter the court's role is a novel question, which must be kept
conceptually separate from the question of whether the parties should have that power. Since
the statements in Chicago Typographical are only dicta, the only federal authority addressing
whether parties can alter the court's role in arbitration remains the three cases discussed in
this Part.
76. See id.
77. Id. Note that the LaPine court makes its argument under the umbrella of the
jurisdiction exception mentioned in FICAL. Yet, the LaPine argument is not really about
jurisdiction. Like the court in FICAL, the LaPine court never denied that it had subject matter
jurisdiction. The argument is really about the power conferred upon the court by statute.
78. See id. at 705.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 705-06. The court conceded the possibility that such a public policy barrier
might not have existed in FICAL. The FICAL court found that public policy was not offended
because, even though the court's role in reviewing the award had been expanded, that role was
still less than what would have been required in a trial absent arbitration. See id.; supra Part
H.A.1.
81. Id. at 706.
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reduced the expected benefits of arbitration for both the public and
the courts. 82
Although admitting the factual similarity, the court paid scant
attention to the Gateway decision.83  Finding the Chicago
Typographical dicta more compelling than the Gateway holding, the
court completed its dismissal of Gateway by finding it inconsistent
with the public policies supporting arbitration.Y The court also dis-
missed the precedential value of Supreme Court decisions concerning
the parties' power to specify arbitration rules, because the decisions
did not focus on the courts' role in the process. 8 After refusing to
alter its role, the court examined the arbitration award for compliance
with the FAA.8s Finding compliance, the court confirmed the award.8 7
III. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION
Obtaining an understanding of the FAA's purposes and func-
tions is necessary to consider whether parties to an arbitration
agreement should be allowed to alter contractually the FAA's scope of
judicial review. This understanding can best be accomplished
through historical inquiry and judicial interpretation.
A. The FAA: A Response to Judicial Hostility toward Arbitration
Seventeenth century American arbitration law found its origin
in the English common law.88 By adopting the English law, American
courts were infected with a hostility toward arbitration not normally
82. See id.
83. See id. at 704. The court did take judicial notice of the parties' briefs in Gateway and
in the unpublished district court decision. This notice was only to address LaPine's contention
that the issue of judicial review was not really before the appellate court and that the Fifth
Circuit's decision should therefore have no precedential value. The court summarily dismissed
LaPine's argument. See id.
84. See id. at 704-05.
85. See id. at 705. Nevertheless, Parts IU.B and IV examine Supreme Court interpreta-
tions.
86. See id. at 706-09. The court also dismissed Kyocera's argument that the court's
refusal to honor the full terms of the agreement rendered the entire agreement unenforceable.
See id. at 706.
87. See id. at 709.
88. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995); Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir. 1942); Paul L. Sayre,
Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 612 (1928). The English were
not the first to use arbitration, however. Its use has been traced back as far as ancient Greece
and Rome. See Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United
States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 242-46 (1928); Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 132-33 (1934).
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found in other cultures.8s The ultimate effect of this hostility was the
courts' refusal, with few exceptions, to force parties to fulfill executory
agreements to arbitrate.9° While this hostility did not include judicial
refusal to enforce the award of an arbitrator,9' such awards were
subject to virtually unlimited judicial review, potentially eliminating
any advantages derived from the use of arbitration.92
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the commercial
world had begun to realize the potential value of judicially enforceable
arbitration,93 and in time, the legal community also began to see the
89. See Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983-84; John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and
Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.
L. REV. 219, 223-25 (1986). The English bias against arbitration seems to have been the result
of several factors. Foremost was the concern that allowing parties to contract for arbitration
would oust the courts of jurisdiction. See United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake
Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1008-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924); Burger,
supra note 5, at 277. The courts proclaimed such ouster to be against public policy. See
Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983. Considering the general acceptance of arbitration in other
developed cultures, this claim was dubious at best. See id. The real reason for the courts'
jealous protection of jurisdiction was most likely their complete dependence on case fees for
income. See id. at 983 n.14; Allison, supra, at 224. The American courts originally followed the
public policy reasoning, but soon developed their own reasons to justify the hostility toward
arbitration. See United States Asphalt Ref Co., 222 F. at 1008-12.
Another adopted fear was that arbitrators could not provide a proper recourse for valid legal
grievances. See Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983; S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2-3. Curiously, this fear
seemed to be greater for lawyers than for businessmen. See Jones, supra note 88, at 256. The
courts believed that arbitrators were not well suited to decide either questions of law or fact.
This attitude became quite pervasive and the American courts retained it well into the
twentieth century. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 211, 223-24 (1995) (describing the
Court's distrust of arbitration's capabilities); see also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432-38 (1953)
(finding that the standards of arbitration were insufficient to protect a claimant's federal
securities claim). Only in the last few decades did the Court change its opinion of arbitration
and overrule Wilko. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
481-86 (1989); infra Part II.B.
Another factor in the legal community's hostility toward arbitration was the bar's attempt to
professionalize. See Allison, supra, at 224-25. If arbitration became a viable alternative to
litigation, the fear was that lawyers with specialized expertise in litigation would be displaced.
As a result, lawyers had little incentive to promote arbitration. See id.
90. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-22 (1924); The Atlanten,
252 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1920); Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 985; Bulk Carriers Corp. v. Kasmu Laeva
Omanikud, 43 F. Supp. 761, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). While not specifically enforceable, executory
agreements were found to be valid, and upon breach, an action for damages would lie. See Red
Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 121. Only nominal damages could be recovered, however. See
Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 984; Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322 (S.D.N.Y.
1921).
91. See Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 120-21; Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The
New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 270-71 (1926).
92. See Allison, supra note 89, at 224; Cohen & Dayton, supra note 91, at 270.
93. See Atlantic Fruit Co., 276 F. at 322; Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.,
271 F.2d 402, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1959). See generally Carl F. Taeusch, Extrajudicial Settlement of
Controversies: The Business Man's Opinion: Trial at Law v. Nonjudicial Settlement, 83 U. PA.
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sensibility in enforcing such agreements. 94 Unfortunately, not all
courts agreed on the propriety of judicial enforcement. 95 Even those
courts willing to enforce the agreements suffered from the constraints
of precedent and thought that making executory arbitration agree-
ments enforceable was the province of the legislature.96
In response to the lack of judicial enforcement at common law,
legislatures enacted statutes placing agreements to arbitrate on equal
footing with other contracts.97 The most important of these statutes
was the FAA, enacted by Congress on February 12, 1925.98 The FAA's
L. REv. 147 (1934) (stating that the business world would determine how extensively
commercial arbitration will be used based upon its usefulness in meeting business objectives).
94. See Atlantic Fruit Co., 276 F. at 321; Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania
Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250, 258-59 (1872) ("The better way, doubtless, is to give effect to [arbitration
agreements], when lawful in themselves, according to their terms and the intent of the parties;
and any departure from this principle is an anomaly in the law...."). The courts were
probably most concerned with clearing their overcrowded dockets. See Jones, supra note 88, at
257-58. Lawyers realized that their role merely changed from that of litigator to that of advisor.
See id. at 258; Tdeusch, supra note 93, at 148. Even the English, from whom the American
courts inherited their hostility, had recognized the benefits of arbitration by enacting legislation
making such agreements enforceable. See Jones, supra note 88, at 246.
95. See Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983; Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C.R. Co., 105 N.E.
653, 656 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J., concurring) ("It is true that some judges have expressed the
belief that parties ought to be free to contract about such matters as they please. In this state
the law has long been settled to the contrary.").
96. See S. REP. No. 536, at 3 (1924); see also Atlantic Fruit Co., 276 F. at 322-23; United
States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1010-1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
97. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995) (explaining
the purpose of the FAA was to overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate).
The first states to make arbitration agreements valid, enforceable, and irrevocable were
New York in 1920 and New Jersey in 1923. See Jones, supra note 88, at 248-49. Today, all
states except Alabama, Mississippi, and West Virginia have modern arbitration statutes. See
DOMKn, supra note 1, § 4:01, at 28. The essential elements of a modern arbitration statute are:
1. irrevocability of any agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration;
2. power of a party, pursuant to a court directive, to compel a recalcitrant party to
proceed to arbitration;
3. provision that any court action instituted in violation of an arbitration agreement
may be stayed until arbitration in the agreed manner has taken placp;
4. authority of the court to appoint arbitrators and fill vacancies when the parties do
not make the designation, or when arbitrators withdraw or become unable to serve
during the arbitration;
5. restrictions on the court's freedom to review the findings of facts by the arbitrator
and his application of the law;
6. specification on the grounds on which awards may be attacked for procedural
defects, and of time limits for such challenges.
Id. at 1-2.
98. See infra Part III.B for a discussion on the importance of the FAA
The FAA was enacted in direct response to judicial hostility. See Robert Lawrence Co., Inc.,
271 F.2d at 406-08. The legislative history of the FAA provides additional insight into its
purpose. The House Report stated:
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law.... [Blecause of
the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce
specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted
from their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle
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major components make written arbitration agreements valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable; 99 provide mechanisms to enforce such agree-
ments;ce allow the parties, or the court if the agreed selection process
fails, to select the arbitrators;'01 give arbitrators the power to summon
witnesses and subpoena documents; 10 2 and severely curtail judicial
review of arbitration awards. 0 3
While the FAA made numerous changes to the legal commu-
nity's treatment of arbitration, two changes are particularly notewor-
thy. First, executory agreements to arbitrate became legally enforce-
able.'04 Previously, only awards resulting from completed arbitration
became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the
American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be
overturned without legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticised the
rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from it. The bill
declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced ....
H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924). The Senate Report similarly voiced concern over judicial
hostility, and noted that "practical justice in the enforced arbitration of disputes [exists] where
written agreements for that purpose have been voluntarily and solemnly entered into." S. REP.
No. 68-536, at 3.
The original proponents and drafters of the FAA found the statute to be directed at three
"evils" inherent in litigation: delay, expense, and unjust results when measured by the stan-
dards of the business world. See COMITTE ON COMMERCE, TRADE AND COMMERCIAL LAw, The
United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 155-56 (1925).
99. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Section 2 states that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
100. See id. §§ 3-4, 9. Section 3 allows a party to any suit or proceeding in any court of the
United States to stay such suit or proceeding if the issue concerned is by written agreement
referable to arbitration. See id. § 3. Section 4 instructs courts to order parties into arbitration
when one party has been aggrieved by the failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written arbitration agreement, unless the making of the agreement or the failure to
comply is itself at issue. See id. § 4. Section 9 directs the courts to issue an order confirming an
arbitration award upon any party's application, if such application is made within one year after
the award was made, and the award has not been vacated, modified, or corrected under the level
of judicial review proscribed in sections 10 or 11. See id. § 9.
101. See id. § 5.
102. See id. § 7.
103. See id. §§ 10-11. For the full text of section 10, see note 19. Section 11 allows a court
to modify or correct an award in the interest of justice so as to effect the true intent of the
award. Specifically, upon the application of any party to the arbitration agreement, the court
may modify or correct an award when an obvious miscalculation of figures or an evident error in
the description of any item referred to in the award is present; when the arbitrator made an
award upon a matter not submitted to him, and the matter affected the merits of the decision
upon the matter submitted; or when the award's form is imperfect and does not affect the
controversy's merits. See id. § 11.
104. See id. § 2.
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were normally enforceable.105 Second, the courts could vacate or mod-
ify an award procured through a valid arbitration process only under
a very narrowly defined set of conditions.106 This second modification
of the law is the focus of this Note.
The FAA protects the efficiency of arbitration and gives the
parties confidence in the final award by providing only extremely
narrow grounds for judicial review.10 7 By creating an exclusive list of
grounds for review, Congress completed the task of putting arbitra-
tion agreements on an equal footing with other contracts. 108 Merely
making agreements to arbitrate enforceable would not have been a
satisfactory solution. Without the limitations on judicial review,
parties compelled to arbitrate under the FAA could easily circumvent
the result by challenging the arbitrator's award.
B. Judicial Developments: A Brief Look at What the FAA
Means Today
The FAA governs all arbitration agreements "evidencing a
transaction involving commerce."109 Congress enacted the FAA using
its powers under the Commerce Clause.110 The substantive provision,
section 2, makes arbitration agreements valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable."' The Act applies in both federal and state courts, and
state law contrary to its substantive provision is preempted.112
105. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
106. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11.
107. See id; supra note 19 and accompanying text. Note that the FAA's grounds for vaca-
tur, modification, and correction found in sections 10 and 11 are not substantive in nature.
They serve as procedural devices for ascertaining implied limits to which the parties contracted.
The parties contracted for the final arbitration award, unless it was procured by fraud,
collusion, or one of the other grounds. The procedural grounds serve to define the scope of the
parties' contractual obligation. See infra Part VA; ef Volt Info. Sciences Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,478 (1989).
108. Although the statute seems clear in its limitation of judicial review, many courts have
created their own additional mechanisms for determining when arbitration awards should be
vacated. See generally Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 833-38 (1996) (finding that while these
grounds exist, the majority of them are not valid exercises of judicial power under the FAA).
While the merits of these mechanisms are beyond the scope of this Note, other commentators
have addressed their propriety. See generally Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial
Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the 'Manifest
Disregard" of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REV. 241 (1993); Brett F. Randall, Note, The
History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration
Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 759.
109. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA also governs all maritime transactions. See id.
110. See Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,405 (1967).
111. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
112. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984).
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The constitutional definition of "evidencing a transaction in-
volving commerce" is quite broad. "Involving" is the equivalent of
"affecting," and as such reaches to the full extent of Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause.11 "[Elvidencing a transaction" does not
require the parties to have contemplated a transaction affecting com-
merce; instead it merely requires that effect to have in fact
occurred.14 Such a broad definition of commerce will include a
substantial number of arbitration agreements. 1 5
Federal policy also favors arbitration."6 According to the
Supreme Court, "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration," whether the issue is the
construction of the contract language or an allegation of waiver, delay,
or other defense to arbitrability."7
The only limitation on the enforceability of arbitration provi-
sions governed by the FAA is that an arbitration agreement can be
"revoked upon 'grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.' ,118 These grounds are typical contract defenses such
as fraud, duress, and unconscionability." 9 Even this limitation is
dampened, however, by two criteria. First, these defenses must be
aimed at the agreement to arbitrate itself. 20 In other words, the arbi-
tration clause is examined in isolation when determining whether an
agreement to arbitrate existed in the first place.121 Second, these
defenses must be arbitration neutral. States harboring some hostility
to arbitration cannot enact legislation aimed to defeat arbitration
agreements solely on the basis of their identity. State law is valid as
113. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-77 (1995).
114. See id. at 279-81.
115. See Janet M. Grossnickle, Note, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: How the
Federal Arbitration Act Will Keep Consumers and Corporations Out of the Courtroom, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 769, 789-91 (1995); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (finding that such a broad reading will displace many state statutes).
116. See Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 25 (1982).
117. See id. Typically, the court has the power to determine if the parties intended to
arbitrate. If the parties agreed to leave the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator, however,
then the arbitrator decides the issue, and the coures review is limited by the grounds enumer-
ated in the FAA. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995).
118. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1982) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). The
Court found that the requirement that the agreement be part of a written maritime contract or
a contract affecting interstate commerce to be another limitation on enforceability under state
law. See id. This requirement does not limit enforceability, however, because it defines the
coverage of the Act.
119. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1996).
120. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,402-04 (1967).
121. For example, if a party to an arbitration agreement alleges fraud in the inducement of
the contract generally, the issue must proceed to arbitration. If the claim is fraud in the in-
ducement of the arbitration clause, however, a court may decide the claim. See id.
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to arbitration agreements only if the purpose behind the law is to
govern the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts gen-
erally.122
While the FAA's substantive command and the federal policy
favoring arbitration cannot be contradicted by state law,M the appli-
cability of the FAA's procedural devices to state court proceedings has
never been determined.1M One aspect of procedure is certain, how-
ever. Parties to an arbitration agreement can choose not to have the
FAA's procedural provisions apply by including a choice-of-law provi-
sion in their contract. 2 5 If the parties agreed to such a clause, and the
court finds that the parties intended the provision to result in the
governance of state procedures, the FAA will be preempted.126 This
flexibility is constrained by two limitations. First, the parties must
make their intention to have state law govern absolutely clear. 27
122. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,492-93 n.9 (1987). The Court explained:
A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration
agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it
otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state law. Nor may a court rely
on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that
enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what we
hold today the state legislature cannot.
Id. at 492-93.
123. See supra note 111, infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
124. The FAA compliments section 2, which makes arbitration agreements enforceable,
with two procedural enforcement provisions that speak only of "courts of the United States" and
"United States district court[s]." 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1994). The Supreme Court has not
determined whether those provisions nonetheless apply to state court proceedings. See Volt
Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6
(1989).
125. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 472-79. The choice-of-law clause need only be
included within the contract as a whole. It does not have to be within the arbitration clause
itself. The court's determination of whether the parties intended to have the state law
procedural devices govern is what is important. See id. The Volt decision is examined in Part
IV.
126. See id. Determining the parties' intent may not be an easy task, however. See Arthur
S. Feldman, Note, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University: Confusing Federalism with Federal Policy Under the FAA, 69 TEX. L. REV.
691, 711-19 (1991) (examining the difficulty that a court may face in determining the parties'
intent as to what law governs when they have agreed to a choice-of-law clause).
127. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53-64 (1995). In
Mastrobuono, the Court used a dubious contract interpretation to uphold an arbitrator's award
of punitive damages. The parties had incorporated a New York choice-of-law clause into their
agreement, but New York law prohibited arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. The
Court found the agreement ambiguous, and as such, any doubts were to be resolved in favor of
arbitration. The Court then upheld the arbitrator's award. See id. at 62-63.
One commentator has read Mastrobuono as establishing:
[Cihoice-of-law provisions are properly interpreted to exclude a particular matter from
arbitration, or to limit the arbitration proceeding in a manner inconsistent with the
FAA, only when the parties' contract clearly and unequivocally evidences a mutual
intent to that effect. Given the "boilerplate" nature of and vague wording of the typical
contractual choice-of-law provision, that result seems unlikely in most cases.
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Second, state procedures can never undermine the federal policy
favoring the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 128 Whether
courts can turn to state law procedures instead of the FAA for gov-
ernance absent such a choice-of-law clause is uncertain. Presumably,
as long as the state procedures do not frustrate the federal policy,
they could govern.129
Typically, parties wishing to confirm, modify, or vacate an
arbitration award will find themselves in state court because of arbi-
tration's contractual nature. 130 Most states have passed arbitration
statutes that supply their courts with the authority to hear these re-
quests.13 1 But these state statutes, when in conflict with the FAA's
substantive commands, should only govern those few agreements not
concerning interstate commerce or a maritime transaction.
Unfortunately, many state courts still mistakenly examine arbitration
agreements for compliance with their own state statutes when the
FAA should govern. 3 2
Hayford, supra note 22, at 21.
128. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 477-78; Doctor's Assos., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116
S. Ct. 1652, 1655-57 (1996). Evidently, the Court will not allow the states to use this opening to
undo the decades of Court jurisprudence favoring arbitration. To what extent the Court will
allow states to enact procedural provisions that do not substantively conflict with the FAA is
beyond the scope of this Note. See Feldman, supra note 126, at 720-27 (arguing that states
should only be allowed to gap-fill or update the FAA when such provisions would further the
federal policy favoring arbitration); see also Dwight F. Pierce, Note, The Federal Arbitration Act:
Conflicting Interpretations of Its Scope, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 623, 634-51 (1994) (analyzing
conflicting cases in judicial attempts to follow Volt).
129. While a definitive answer is beyond the scope of this Note, other authors have ad-
dressed the question. See generally Jon R. Schumacher, Note, The Reach of the Federal
Arbitration Act: Implications on State Procedural Law, 70 N.D. L. REV. 459, 482-84 (1994)
(finding that no practical reason against upholding state statutes that do not conflict with the
federal policy favoring arbitration exists); Feldman, supra note 126, at 725-26 (reaching the
same conclusion).
130. The FAA does not create independent federal question jurisdiction. See Moses H.
Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1982). The Court explained further:
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction.
It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to
honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V) or otherwise. Section 4 provides
for an order compelling arbitration only when the federal district court would have
jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of
citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction before the order can
issue. Section 3 likewise limits the federal courts to the extent that a federal court
cannot stay a suit pending before it unless there is such a suit in existence.
Nevertheless, although enforcement of the Act is left in large part to the state courts, it
nevertheless represents federal policy to be vindicated by the federal courts where
otherwise appropriate.
Id. (citation omitted).
131. See DOMEE, supra note 1, § 4:01, at 2 (noting that only Alabama, West Virginia, and
Mississippi do not have modem arbitration statutes).
132. As one leading commentator has noted:
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In summary, the FAA governs a substantal number of arbitra-
tion agreements. The federal policy favoring arbitration subjects the
enforcement of those agreements to few limitations. States are bound
by the substantive command of section 2 of the FAA, which makes
arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."13 State law contrary to this command, whether procedural
or substantive, is preempted. This requirement should prevent state
law expansion of the courts' role in judicial review, because displacing
finality undermines the FAA's command of enforcement.' M Merely
following federal policy in holding arbitration agreements enforceable
is not sufficient if the losing party can challenge arbitration awards in
a court acting under an expanded role. Whether parties can contrac-
tually expand the judicial role will be determined in Part V.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS: FOR WHAT CAN PARTIES CONTRACT?
This Part focuses on two Supreme Court decisions that answer
two critical questions. First, under what circumstances may parties
contract for variations on the statutory rules governing arbitration?
Second, is enforcing the parties' agreement to the letter more impor-
tant than increasing the efficiency of the process? In answering these
questions, the opinions shed light on the Court's willingness to en-
force arbitration agreements to the letter.
A. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior University, Volt Information Sciences ("Volt")
entered into a construction contract with the Board of Trustees of
Although the state arbitration statutes appear to be an impressive body of law and are
accompanied by very extensive judicial interpretation, the arena of their applicability
has been vastly reduced by recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Indeed, it is likely that they now apply only to the fringes of economic activity, those
rare fringes not affecting interstate commerce in its constitutional sense. It is extremely
important to recognize what has happened, as there are still many arbitration cases
being decided under state law that are quite clearly governed by the FAA.
IANR. MACNEILET AL., FEDERALARBITRATION LAW § 5.4.4, at 5:13-14 (1995) (citations omitted).
133. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
134. See Zhaodong Jiang, Note, Federal Arbitration Law and State Court Proceedings, 23
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473, 527-28 (1990). The point is somewhat moot, however, in light of the
current statutory uniformity in grounds for vacatur or modification of arbitration awards. See
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Stanford University under which Volt was to install an electrical
system.135 The contract contained an arbitration agreement that
covered disputes arising from the contract and a choice-of-law clause
that effectively provided that California law governed. 13 6 A dispute
arose, and Volt demanded arbitration. 137 Stanford, however, filed an
action in California Superior Court against Volt and two other
companies with whom it had not made arbitration agreements. 38
Volt asked the court to compel arbitration, but the court refused. 39 In
doing so, the court relied on a California statute that permitted it to
stay arbitration "pending resolution of related litigation between a
party to the arbitration agreement and third parties not bound by it,
when 'there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of
law or fact.'"140 The California Court of Appeal affirmed, even though
it recognized that the contract came within the purview of the FAA.'4'
The California Supreme Court denied Volt's petition for discretionary
review 42
The Supreme Court rejected Volt's argument that the
California Court of Appeal essentially found that Volt had waived a
federally guaranteed right to compel arbitration.43 Noting that the
FAA was designed to place arbitration agreements on equal footing
with other contracts, the Court held that the FAA did not confer an
automatic right to compel arbitration in all situations.'" Rather, the
FAA only gives the right to compel arbitration in the manner provided
by the agreement.145 Recognizing that it was bound by the contractual
interpretation of the California Court of Appeal, the Court found that,
by incorporating California law, the parties had agreed not to proceed
with arbitration until related pending litigation, pursuant to the
California statute, was resolved. 46 The Court then found that this
conclusion was not a finding of a waiver, but a finding that the parties
135. 489 U.S. 468,470 (1989).
136. See id. The choice of law clause provided that the law of the place where the project
was located would govern. The project was located in California. See id.
137. See id. at 470-71.
138. See id. at 471.
139. See id.
140. Id. (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1281.2(c)).
141. See id. at 471-72.
142. See id. at 472-73.
143. See id. at 474.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 474-75.
146. See id. at 475.
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had not agreed to arbitrate until the California statute's requirements
had been met.147
The Court also rejected Volt's contention that such a finding
would be contrary to the federal policy favoring arbitration.148 While
agreeing that such a policy exists, the Court did not find that the
Court of Appeal's interpretation of the choice-of-law provision was
offensive to it.49 Instead, the Court asserted that the federal policy of
enforcing agreements to arbitrate according to their terms does not
extend to favoring enforcement under a certain set of procedural
rules.15o
Last, the Court explored the preemptive effect of the FAA.
Noting that the FAA governed the contract, the Court found no lan-
guage within the FAA that would allow a court to stay arbitration. 5'
The Court stated that preemption turned on the answer to one critical
question-whether the state law, as applied under the terms of the
agreement, would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.152 The
Court concluded that the FAA's primary goal was the enforcement of
parties' agreements by their terms and that the expeditious resolution
of disputes was secondary.'53 Consequently, parties can contract for
their own procedural rules so long as they do not undermine the
FAA's substantive command of making the agreement enforceable.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 476.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 476-77.
152. See id. at 477-78.
153. See id. at 478. The Court continued:
[I]t does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such a result would
be quite inimical to the FAA's primary purpose of ensuring that private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of
consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration
agreements as they see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues they will
arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will
be conducted. Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of
arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully
consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed
where the Act would otherwise permit it to go forward. By permitting the courts to
"rigorously enforce" such agreements according to their terms, we give effect to the
contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing violence to the policies
behind the FAA-
Id. at 479 (citations omitted).
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B. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, the Supreme Court
determined whether a district court should compel arbitration of an
arbitrable claim when arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims are
pleaded in the same complaint.54 More importantly for purposes of
this Note, the Court was forced to weigh the efficiency of arbitration
against the goal of enforcing arbitration agreements.
The issue arose when Byrd invested with Dean Witter and
signed a contract agreeing to arbitrate future disputes.155 A large
portion of his investment was lost within the year, and he filed suit in
the District Court for the Southern District of California, alleging
violations of various federal and state law provisions.15 6 Dean Witter,
assuming the federal claims were not subject to arbitration and as
such could only be resolved in federal court, asked the court to compel
arbitration of only the state law claims.157 The district court refused
to compel arbitration, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.18
In addressing the issue, the Court resolved a split among the
circuits. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had relied on the
"doctrine of intertwining," which gave district courts the discretion to
deny arbitration and to try both the arbitrable and nonarbitrable
claims together in federal court when the claims arose out of the same
transaction and were sufficiently factually and legally intbrtwined. 59
These courts acknowledged the strong federal policy in favor of arbi-
tration, but argued that compelling arbitration would reduce effi-
ciency because the claims would result in bifurcated proceedings and
duplicate litigation.160 The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, how-
ever, had found that no such discretion could exist in light of the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration and the plain wording of the
FAA.' s' These courts refused to substitute their own views of effi-
ciency for those of Congress and would always compel arbitration
under the agreement. 62 The Supreme Court agreed with the latter
154. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
155. See id. at 214-15.
156. See id. at 214.
157. See id. at 215.
158. See id. at 215-16.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 217.
161. See id. The FAA provides in section 4 that the district "court shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." 9
U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (emphasis added).
162. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 217.
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perspective and held that district courts do not have discretion to
refuse to compel arbitration when both arbitrable and nonarbitrable
claims exist, even though inefficiencies may result.163 Finding that
the parties had agreed to arbitrate, the Court proceeded to compel
arbitration. 164
In reaching its decision, the Court was confronted with the
argument that Congress's primary intent in enacting the FAA was to
maximize efficiency in dispute resolution and that the goal of enforc-
ing private arbitration agreements should be subservient to that in-
tent.165 Delving into the legislative history of the FAA, the Court
rejected the argument that expeditious dispute resolution was
Congress's primary goal.166 Quite the opposite, the Court found that
Congress was principally motivated by a desire to enforce parties'
agreements. 16 7 The Court noted that "the fortuitous impact of the Act
on efficient dispute resolution [should not be permitted] to over-
shadow the underlying motivation."68 Agreements must be enforced
even if the result is "piecemeal" legislation.69 Thus, the Supreme
Court found that congressional policy favors sacrificing efficiency
when necessary to honor the parties' agreement.
V. ANALYSIS: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
Examining the propriety of parties' contractual attempts to
expand the limited grounds for judicial review requires a two-step
approach. First, whether parties have the power to alter the court's
role as defined by the FAA must be determined. Can parties contrac-
tually expand the limitations placed upon judicial review by statute?
Second, the question of whether parties should be allowed to make
such agreements must be resolved. Would enforcing the agreement
undermine the goals of judicially enforceable arbitration?
A. Can Parties Contract for Judicial Review?
Do parties to arbitration have the power to alter a court's role
as established by the FAA? The LaPine court made a strong argu-
163. See id.
164. See id. at 223-24.
165. See id. at 218-21.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 220.
168. Id. (citation omitted).
169. See id. at 220-21.
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ment that they do not.17o That court concluded that parties usurp
Congress's authority to determine the judiciary's role when they
contractually alter that role.Y7' That court was also concerned with
the resulting loss in efficiency. 7 2 Both the FICAL and Gateway
courts, however, found that the contractual nature of arbitration took
precedence over the statutory limitations on the courts' role.'73 A look
at Supreme Court interpretations of the FAA and a look at the pur-
pose of the limited grounds for judicial review in the FAA reveal that
FICAL and Gateway were correct-parties can contract for an in-
creased scope of judicial review.
In Volt, the Supreme Court noted that the FAA was not in-
tended to occupy the entire arena of arbitration lawY74 Finding
parties generally free to specify by contract the rules under which
they will conduct arbitration, the Court did not hesitate to sacrifice
procedure or efficiency in favor of honoring the contractual
agreement.7 5 Thus, no per se rule that parties must use the proce-
dural devices of the FAA exists. Instead, only two discernable
limitations exist on the extent to which parties may contract for
procedural rules: (1) the intent to do so must be clear and (2) the
rules for which the parties contract cannot undermine the FAA's
policy of enforcing agreements to arbitrate. 76  The arbitration
agreements discussed in Part II do not violate either limitation. The
agreements are clear in their intent to expand upon the level of
judicial review17 and the expanded judicial review does not challenge
the enforceability of the agreement.
Arguably, increasing the scope of judicial review substantively
undermines enforceability. By allowing parties to take an arbitration
award to a court acting under a de novo (or other increased) standard,
the finality of the arbitration process has, at least indirectly, been
compromised. Compromising finality could be understood to mean a
170. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. Of the three federal cases that have ad-
dressed the question, only LaPine attempts to provide its reasoning. Moreover, only LaPine
cites any precedent for its conclusion. Its heavy reliance on that precedent was misplaced,
however, as it was only dicta. Thus, the only real authority for the answer to the question is
these three cases.
171. See id.
172 See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 705-06 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
173. See supra notes 35-39 and 54-58 and accompanying text.
174. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
175. See id. at 475-79.
176. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 30, 47, 66 and accompanying text. Each agreement expands upon the
level of review provided by the FAA. See supra note 19.
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corresponding undermining of enforceability. Such a conclusion,
however, would be erroneous. First, federal policy favors enforcing
arbitration agreements according to their terms, 78 and an expanded
judicial review clause is part of those terms. Second, the grounds for
vacatur enumerated in the FAA actually are only codified forms of
contractual interpretation.179 They serve only to aid the court in de-
termining exactly for what the parties contracted, by representing
implicit limitations on the contractual obligation. In this regard, the
arbitration award can be viewed as the arbitration contract itself,
with the FAA's provisions only helping to define the agreement's
scope. When the parties have clearly and unequivocally contracted
for additional grounds, these grounds become part of the agreement,
and as such, must be enforced. Since the grounds in the FAA serve
only to determine for what the parties really contracted, the FAA
should not invalidate clear agreements that define the scope of the
obligation.
The LaPine court was unpersuaded by the argument that
parties can contract for their own procedural rules when the
procedures affect the court's role in the process. This ignores the facts
of Volt itself.80 The challenge in Volt also concerned a contractual
alteration of the court's role in the arbitration process.'8' Section 4 of
the FAA states that the "court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration."182 Section 3 directs a court to stay
litigation when an issue is referable to arbitration.'8 Yet the court in
Volt held that the parties were within their rights to contract for a
rule that would allow the court to stay arbitration pending the
outcome of related litigation.'8 Thus, under Volt, parties have the
right to alter a court's role in the arbitration process.
Volt can also be read as holding that a reduction in benefits
expected from arbitration does not preclude expansion of the judicial
role. The Court's holding allowed one of the parties to stay arbitra-
tion until related litigation with other nonparties to the arbitration
agreement was complete. At the very least, this decision will result in
some delay before the parties enter arbitration and will carry some
additional cost. The Supreme Court's holding in Dean Witter also
178. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 475-79.
179. See supra note 107.
180 See LaPine Tech. Corp., 909 F. Supp. at 705.
181. See supra Part IVA for a discussion of Volt.
182. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (emphasis added).
183. Id. § 3.
184. See supra Part IVA.
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makes clear that the sacrifice of efficiency does not mandate a finding
that the parties have exceeded their contractual authority l5 Thus, a
reduction in expected benefits does not limit the parties' contractual
power. Whether it should limit that power is examined in Part V.B.
This approach makes sense from an efficiency standpoint. If
the parties had not agreed to arbitrate, they could have taken their
disputes to court, and the court would have been forced to hear the
substance of the claim. By agreeing to arbitrate, however, the parties
legitimately bypassed the court.'8 Should arbitration fail, or if the
parties want to expand the court's role, they will only end up where
they could have gone initially. No logical reason to penalize the
parties for choosing to arbitrate exists. 8 7
In summary, parties do have the power to alter contractually
the judicial role. The Supreme Court has clearly established that the
FAA's procedural devices are not set in stone. Agreements that alter
these devices at the expense of some expected benefits do not exceed
the parties' contractual power. Instead, increasing the judicial role
represents a contractual obligation that the FAA is meant to define
and enforce, not invalidate.
B. Should Parties Be Allowed to Contract for Increased
Judicial Review?
Having determined that arbitration parties can contract for
increased judicial review would seem to end the analysis. Both the
district court in LaPine'88 and the district court in Gateway,5 9 how-
ever, argued that public policy must be a factor in deciding whether to
allow parties to increase contractually the court's role.19° Those courts
185. See supra Part W.B.
186. Of course, the judiciary will still play a role should either party seek enforcement.
187. See infra Part V.B for an analysis of why parties should be allowed to increase the role
of the court.
188. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
190. Admittedly, practical limits exist regarding for what arbitration parties can contract
while still expecting the courts to enforce the agreement by limiting their review to the grounds
in the FAA. For decades, courts have recognized these limitations and have often stretched
their role to include examinations of awards for "manifest disregard of the law" or violations of
public policy. Hayford, supra note 108, at 739. Practically, policy influences must play some
role. When confronted with potential public policy violations, some commentators have
suggested that courts be permitted to make ad hoe determinations rather than be confined to
the statutory standards of review. See Francis E. Jones, Jr., The Nature of the Court's
'Jurisdiction" in Statutory Arbitration Post-Award Motions, 46 CAL. L. REV. 411, 411-19 (1958);
Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Role of Public Policy, 58 Nw. L. REv. 545, 548 (1963).
Commentators have also argued that courts often exceed their authority and undermine the
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claimed that the loss of expected benefits resulting from such agree-
ments violated public policy, and therefore, precluded their enforce-
ment. For a complete analysis, these concerns must be addressed.
The question, then, is should parties be allowed to contract for in-
creased judicial review?
To analyze whether parties should be allowed to increase the
courts' role, a list of expected benefits that support the public policy
rationale must be established. The drafters of the FAA promoted the
statute as combating three main "evils," all related to efficiency. First
is the delay incident to a proceeding in the courts. 191 In centers of
commercial activity where the court calendars are frequently con-
gested, the delay often amounts to several years. 192 Factors contribut-
ing to this delay are preliminary motions and other steps that liti-
gants may take and the appeals that are open to them.93 The second
evil that the FAA was designed to combat is the expense of litiga-
tion.94 The last evil is the failure, through litigation, to reach a deci-
sion regarded as just when measured by the standards of the business
world. 95 This failure may result either because the courts necessarily
apply general rules that do not fit all cases or because the judge or
jury is not, and cannot be made, familiar with the peculiarities of the
given controversy. 96 A judgment by individuals experienced in the
relevant field is one of the greatest advantages of arbitration. 97
Other expected benefits of arbitration include privacy,
adaptability, the parties' control over the process, reduction in
hostilities, and lack of disruption of current and future dealings
between the parties.198 According to the Supreme Court, however, all
of these benefits are secondary to the primary benefit of enforceability.
Dean Witter clearly established that the FAA's primary goal is to
enforce arbitration agreements. 99 Enforceability itself allows parties
to adapt arbitration to meet their needs and generate expected
benefits. While Congress may have had potential efficiencies in mind
when passing the FAA, those motivations were secondary to the
FAA when engaging in such review. See Hayford, supra note 108, at 739. Whether or not
courts should have this discretion is beyond the scope of this Note. In practice, though, courts
exercise such discretion, and any analysis must account for it.
191. See COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, supra note 98, at 155.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 155-56.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part IV.B.
424 [Vol. 50:395
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
primary goal. Thus, sacrificing efficiency20 in favor of enforceability
does not undermine the FAA's primary purpose. Enforcing an
arbitration agreement that provides for expanded judicial review
promotes the primary goal of enforcement, even if it sacrifices some
efficiency and other benefits. In light of the Supreme Court's view of
the goals of the FAA, such an agreement should be enforced,
regardless of other considerations. The Supreme Court's view may
not coincide with that of the parties, however, so the effect of such
agreements on other expectations still must be considered.
When analyzing public policy factors, the LaPine court concen-
trated on the expected benefits to the parties and courts. For simplic-
ity, this Note will work within that framework. From the individual
party's perspective, enforcement of agreements that increase the
court's *role fulfills her expectations. Arbitration is beneficial to indi-
vidual parties because it allows them to structure the process to fit
their needs. Clauses establishing an expanded level of judicial review
exist for a reason, most likely to offer some protection from unpredict-
able or biased results.201 The parties who have made the agreement
expect it to be enforced. Failure to do so may force the parties to
forego any attempt at arbitration, thus removing all potential benefits.
While the district courts in LaPine and Gateway may have been
justified in their concern over the loss of benefits in the individual
cases before them, those courts failed to perceive the effect that their
holdings might have on future parties. Future parties may head
straight to court rather than arbitration, not wanting to risk havinmg
the court invalidate a necessary portion of their arbitration
agreement.
Enforcing agreements to expand judicial review of arbitration
awards, as done in FICAL and Gateway, fulfills the parties' expecta-
tions. Admittedly, a reduction in individual efficiencies may occur.
The process may be longer and more costly than had such an agree-
ment not been enforced. Giving the court an increased voice in the
final solution may also remove much of the efficiency that the arbitra-
tor's expertise creates. Enforcement does not necessarily lead to the
complete reemergence of the three "evils," however. Arbitration may
still save time and expense by narrowing the contested issues. The
court's role will also be limited to that established by the parties. As
long as the parties do not contract for unconstrained judicial review,
200. The same analysis should apply to other expected benefits, such as the parties' control
over the process.
201. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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some efficiency will still be retained. Other advantages and expected
benefits can also be retained to some extent. The parties retain con-
trol over the arbitration process, and the agreement continues to
provide the context for any increased judicial review. Moreover,
limiting the matters before the court will result in increased privacy
and reduced hostility.
In considering the parties' expectations, then, some benefits
may be lost in individual cases in which the parties have agreed to
increased judicial review and actually end up in court. This result is
exactly what they expected, however. On a broader level, enforcing
the agreement to the letter gives other parties the confidence that
their agreements will be upheld. The public must know that it can
contract for what it wants without having to worry about subsequent
court intervention. Judicial enforcement will, therefore, lead to in-
creased, or at least sustained, use of arbitration, with a corresponding
increase in expected public benefits.
This conclusion leads to the second question: Would increasing
the courts' role derail expected judicial benefits? Providing confidence
in the process also alleviates the LaPine court's concern regarding
additional burdens on the judiciary. If individuals know that their
agreements will be upheld, they will be more likely to arbitrate, and
therefore, less likely to end up in court. As a result, enforcing the
agreement to expand judicial review will actually lead to a less
crowded court docket. In addition, as noted in FICAL, even if the
parties arrive in court after years of arbitration, at least the court
does not have to start from the beginning.2 2 It will only have to re-
view an award for compliance with the additional grounds for which
the parties contracted. The arbitration process will also likely have
forced the parties to narrow the issues to be contested in court.
In summary, public policy, as defined through expected bene-
fits to the parties and the courts, supports the conclusion that parties
should be allowed to contract for expanded judicial review of arbitra-
tion awards. While some benefits may be lost to both the courts and
the parties in individual cases, the process will still produce some
benefits over litigation. Enforcing the agreements will also lead to
public confidence and increased use of arbitration, generating future
benefits.
202. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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C. Exploring Other Options
This analysis has shown that parties have the power to in-
crease contractually the scope of judicial review, albeit at the cost of
some expected benefits in individual cases. This conclusion is not
meant to imply, however, that such agreements should be encouraged.
Arbitration's nature can give rise to substantial efficiencies, which are
reduced with expansion of the judicial role. Parties should explore
other alternatives and turn to the courts only as a last resort.
For instance, the parties could limit the arbitrator's power by
providing parameters for her award.203 If the award were outside the
parameters, it would have no effect.2 4 The parties could remove any
possible influence this might have on the arbitrator by agreeing that
she would not be informed of the limitation. While providing
parameters gives the parties greater direction in planning for the
outcome, it does not alleviate the fear of bias. Thus, this procedure is
best-suited for those parties who are more concerned with
unpredictability than partiality. Regardless, parameters may only
provide a partial solution. If the award is outside the parameters and
the parties do not find a way to settle their dispute, they will be forced
to arbitrate again or turn to litigation. The original efficiency gained
by turning to arbitration will be reduced in any subsequent litigation
or arbitration.
Parties could also agree to expand the available scope of judi-
cial review, but provide for potential penalties for its use.205 While
still undermining efficiencies, allowing for penalties will dissuade
parties from running to court in all but the most egregious of circum-
stances. Another option is for the parties to agree to have an appel-
late arbitration panel hear appeals. 206 While this option would add to
overall cost, many of the other efficiencies of arbitration might remain
because the parties would still retain control over the process.
Although some combination of these methods may be helpful,
the parties may decide that an expanded level of judicial review is the
only acceptable procedural protection. If that is the case, their
agreement should be enforced, and the court should conform its re-
view to the scope established contractually by the parties.
203. See Meyerowitz, supra note 4, at 80.
204. See id.
205. See Burger, supra note 5, at 277.
206. See Hayford & Peebles, supra note 4, at 405-06.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The contractual nature of arbitration allows parties to mold it
into a procedure that provides many benefits over other forms of
dispute resolution. For these benefits to occur, arbitration must pro-
vide a binding and final determination. Otherwise, the benefits will
be lost through subsequent litigation. To be binding and final, arbi-
tration must preclude substantial judicial review of resulting awards.
The FAA has met this need and allows for vacatur by judicial review
only on specific, limited grounds.
When parties contract to increase this limited scope of judicial
review, they may sacrifice some of the benefits originally gained by
avoiding litigation. Nevertheless, the primary goal of arbitration
statutes is to enforce the parties' agreements to the letter, lending
confidence to the process. As such, these agreements should be up-
held, regardless of any loss in expected benefits.
Tom Cullinan*
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